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The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual 
Accountability” in All the Wrong Places 
Katrice Bridges Copeland* 
ABSTRACT: The Department of Justice has received a great deal of criticism 
for its failure to prosecute both corporations and individuals involved in 
corporate fraud. In an effort to quiet some of that criticism, on September 9, 
2015, then Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates issued a policy entitled, 
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” or the “Yates 
Memo,” as it has been called. The main thrust of the Yates Memo is that in 
order for a corporation to receive any credit for cooperating with the 
government and obtain leniency in the form of a deferred prosecution 
agreement, the corporation must not only conduct an internal investigation 
and turn over the results, but it must also point the finger at culpable 
employees. The Yates Memo puts a particular emphasis on the need to hold 
high-level officials responsible for misconduct. This Article argues that the 
Yates Memo is a misguided attempt to further put law enforcement 
responsibilities on the backs of corporations rather than the Department of 
Justice.  In addition, the Yates Memo jeopardizes the corporation’s ability to 
conduct effective internal investigations into corporate wrongdoing because it 
threatens both the corporate attorney-client privilege and the relationship 
between employers and employees. This Article maintains that if the 
Department of Justice truly wants to find “individual accountability,” it must 
stop relying on corporations and conduct its own investigations. Furthermore, 
if the Department of Justice wants to obtain criminal convictions of high-level 
executives, there may be a need for new legislation that holds high-level 
executives accountable for the criminal misdeeds of their subordinates. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, the idea of individual criminal accountability 
for corporate misconduct, or even corporate criminal liability, has been 
illusory. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has locked itself into the practice 
of having corporations do the difficult and expensive work of conducting 
internal investigations and turning over the results of those investigations to 
the DOJ.1 The DOJ calls this cooperation and rewards a corporation’s 
assistance with a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”).2 A DPA permits a 
company to save its reputation by avoiding a criminal trial or indictment.3 
Instead, the DOJ files charges but holds them in abeyance for a period of years 
in exchange for the corporation paying a large fine and agreeing to stringent 
compliance measures.4 The practice of entering into DPAs rather than 
indicting corporations, however, has led to a great deal of criticism of the 
DOJ. Critics claim that DPAs are an ineffective deterrent for corporations and 
that the best way to deter corporations is instead through individual 
prosecutions for corporate misconduct.5 In particular, there has been a public 
 
 1. See infra Part II (detailing the evolution of the DOJ’s corporate investigations). 
 2. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301 n.43 (2013). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: 
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1104–05 (2006). 
 5. See, e.g., Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” 
Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the Federal 
Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 30–31 (2014) (arguing that DPAs “are not 
demonstrably better” than individual convictions in furthering the goals of criminal enforcement, 
including deterrence); Uhlmann, supra note 2, at 1298–99. 
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outcry over the fact that, while the financial system collapsed in 2008 due to 
fraudulent practices, the government has failed to hold individuals criminally 
accountable for the misconduct.6 In short, many people have asserted that the 
DOJ is too soft on corporate crime.    
In response to this criticism, the DOJ issued its newest corporate charging 
guidelines on September 9, 2015. Importantly, the policy, entitled, 
“Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing,” or the “Yates Memo,” 
does not focus on when Assistant U.S. Attorneys should bring criminal charges 
against corporations.7 Instead, the focus is on prosecuting individuals within 
the corporate entity and explains that “[o]ne of the most effective ways to 
combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the 
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”8 In essence, the Yates Memo 
doubles down on the DOJ’s policy of resolving corporate misconduct through 
DPAs and non-prosecution agreements (“NPA”) and directs prosecutors to 
bring individual criminal prosecutions. This shift from corporate to individual 
accountability is, in some ways, a natural evolution from the previous policy. 
The previous policy, the 2008 version of the Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations,9 explained that the “[p]rosecution of a 
corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable 
individuals within or without the corporation.”10 Furthermore, the 2008 
version of the guidelines spoke of the need to resolve a corporate criminal 
case through the use of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution 
agreements when the collateral consequences of conviction, such as the 
impact on employees, investors, and customers, outweighed the benefit of a 
criminal prosecution.11 In those instances, the 2008 guidelines explained that 
 
 6. OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016: HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT 
LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY 4 (2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/ 
Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf (arguing that although lax enforcement can be the result of statutory 
limitations, it often is the result of the failure to effectively use the tools already available); Ben Protess 
& Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Two Giant Banks, Seen as Immune, Become Targets, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Apr. 29, 2014, 8:40 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/u-s-close-to-bringing-criminal-
charges-against-big-banks (“A lack of criminal prosecutions of banks and their leaders fueled a public 
outcry over the perception that Wall Street giants are ‘too big to jail.’”). 
 7. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All 
U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yates Memo] (on file with author). 
 8. Id. at 1. The changes in the Yates Memo have now been worked into the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, which is part of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. See 9-28.000—
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice. 
gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations (last visited Apr. 9, 
2017) [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’ Manual]. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.000–28.1300 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/08/28/corp-charging-
guidelines.pdf.  
 10. Id. § 9-28.200(B). 
 11. Id. § 9-28.1000. 
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the non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements should be 
designed “to promote compliance with applicable law and to prevent 
recidivism.”12 Both the Yates Memo and the 2008 guidelines cite deterrence 
as the justification for pursuing criminal charges against individuals and 
corporations, respectively.13  
There is certainly no easy answer to the question of whether individual 
or corporate criminal accountability is the more effective deterrent. Thus, the 
challenge for the DOJ in striking the correct balance between the two while 
protecting the public from the collateral consequences of a corporate 
criminal conviction cannot be overstated. The DOJ’s issuance of the Yates 
Memo, however, signals its belief that the focus should be on individual 
criminal accountability. Yet even if one assumes, arguendo, that holding 
individuals criminally accountable is the most effective deterrent, the Yates 
Memo fails to solve the problem of actually holding individuals criminally 
accountable for corporate misconduct.  
This failure is clearly shown in the Yates Memo’s biggest policy change. 
As will be explained further below, the Yates Memo demanded that 
corporations turn over culpable individuals and all facts relating to their 
culpability before being considered for any cooperation credit.14 In other 
words, if a corporation refuses to turn over culpable employees and all of the 
facts about those employees, it will likely be ineligible for a DPA and will face 
indictment. Thus, cooperation has become an all or nothing proposition. 
However, the single greatest impediment to individual criminal accountability 
for corporate misconduct is not the lack of corporate cooperation; it is the 
government’s over reliance on corporate internal investigations.15 
 
 12. Id. § 9-28.1000(B).  
 13. Id. § 9-28.1200; Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 1. 
 14. Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 1. 
 15. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-
why-no-executive-prosecutions (explaining that the DOJ no longer has “the experience or the 
resources to pursue” individual prosecutions). Judge Rakoff explains the current approach: 
Early in the investigation, you invite in counsel to the company and explain to him 
or her why you suspect fraud. He or she responds by assuring you that the company 
wants to cooperate and do the right thing, and to that end the company has hired a 
former assistant US attorney, now a partner at a respected law firm, to do an internal 
investigation. The company’s counsel asks you to defer your investigation until the 
company’s own internal investigation is completed, on the condition that the 
company will share its results with you. In order to save time and resources, you 
agree. 
Six months later the company’s counsel returns, with a detailed report showing that 
mistakes were made but that the company is now intent on correcting them. You and 
the company then agree that the company will enter into a deferred prosecution 
agreement that couples some immediate fines with the imposition of expensive but 
internal prophylactic measures. For all practical purposes the case is now over. You 
are happy because you believe that you have helped prevent future crimes; the 
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Specifically, while the Yates Memo emphasizes the need for corporate 
cooperation by turning over culpable employees, it also emphasizes the need 
for the government to focus on individuals from the outset of the 
investigation. These goals are wholly incompatible with one another. The 
government relies on the corporation’s internal investigation to target 
culpable individuals. Thus, the only way for the government to focus on 
individuals from the outset of the investigation is to conduct the investigation 
itself. Consequently, if the government actually wants to hold high-level 
executives criminally accountable for corporate misconduct as it claims,16 it 
must conduct its own investigations of corporate misconduct.17  
This Article therefore argues that without a fundamental shift in the 
manner in which the DOJ conducts internal investigations, the Yates Memo 
will not increase individual criminal accountability for corporate wrongdoing. 
This Article assesses the policies in the Yates Memo and the problems that it 
creates given the current environment of corporations sharing the results of 
their internal investigations with the government. Part I of this Article traces 
the evolution of the charging policies and how they disrupt the  
attorney–client privilege. Part II examines the problems created by the Yates 
Memo. Specifically, it argues that the Yates Memo will lead to further 
uncertainty in the application of the corporate attorney–client privilege and 
will disrupt the corporation’s ability to conduct internal investigations. Part 
III argues that the DOJ should abandon the Yates Memo and instead conduct 
its own investigations into corporate wrongdoing if it wants to hold individuals 
criminally accountable. Furthermore, it argues that legislation that targets 
high-level officials is necessary to accomplish the DOJ’s goal of holding high-
level officials criminally accountable for their misconduct. This Article 
concludes that the benefits of the DOJ conducting investigations rather than 
relying on the results of corporate internal investigations outweighs the cost 
of this approach. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The DOJ currently relies heavily on corporations performing their own 
investigations into criminal wrongdoing and then sharing the results with the 
 
company is happy because it has avoided a devastating indictment; and perhaps the 
happiest of all are the executives, or former executives, who actually committed the 
underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched. 
Id. 
 16. 2008 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9, § 9-28.200(B) (The “[p]rosecution of a 
corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals” and “[o]nly 
rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it relates to high-level 
corporate officers.”). 
 17. See generally Rakoff, supra note 15 (explaining that the appropriate way to hold 
individuals responsible is to start at the bottom and flip individuals who can provide information 
about high-level officials rather than asking corporate counsel to perform an internal 
investigation and report the results to the government). 
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DOJ. After receiving the results of the investigation, the DOJ then makes the 
determination of whether to prosecute the corporation or grant some form 
of leniency, such as a deferred prosecution agreement.18 This reliance on the 
corporation’s investigation, however, is not necessarily inevitable. Instead, the 
DOJ issued specific policy pronouncements that contributed to the current 
culture of the DOJ’s reliance on corporations’ internal investigation. This Part 
shows the DOJ’s evolution through its policy pronouncement regarding the 
prosecution of corporations and illustrates that the reliance on internal, 
corporate investigations is not necessarily required.  Further, it demonstrates 
that the DOJ explicitly targeted the corporate attorney–client privilege and 
work-product protection through earlier iterations of its charging policy and 
that the Yates Memo is an unfortunate return to that practice.    
A. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, DPAS, AND THE CULTURE OF WAIVER 
When a corporation is suspected of wrongdoing, it often conducts an 
internal investigation to gather the facts and, assuming that there has been 
misconduct, prepare to mount a legal defense. Corporations, however, are 
not protected by the Fifth Amendment against compelled self-
incrimination.19 Therefore, in the event of a subpoena, any documents in the 
possession of the corporation must be turned over to the government. The 
only protection available to corporations is the corporate attorney–client 
privilege.20 Corporations typically direct their attorneys, whether inside or 
outside counsel, to conduct the investigation. Importantly, by having the 
attorneys conduct the investigation, the results of the investigation, such as 
interview memoranda, factual summaries, and the like, are protected by the 
corporate attorney–client privilege and the work-product doctrine.21  
Therefore, while there is no doubt that the results of an internal investigation 
would be incredibly helpful to the government in building its case, so long as 
the investigation was performed by counsel, corporations can protect their 
findings.   
 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1988) (interpreting Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43 (1906), to mean that a corporation does not possess the Fifth Amendment right 
against compelled self-incrimination); Hale, 201 U.S. at 73, 75–76 (finding that the custodian of 
records for a corporation could not refuse to produce corporate documents pursuant to a 
subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds).  
 20. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–97 (1981) (holding that communications 
between employees and corporate counsel are protected by the corporate attorney–client privilege). 
 21. Id. The corporate attorney–client privilege protects communications between counsel and 
corporate employees. In contrast, the work-product doctrine is not restricted to communications 
between counsel and client. The goal of the work-product doctrine is to allow counsel to work “with a 
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.” 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). Thus, the work-product doctrine protects from 
discovery counsel’s written materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id.  
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The government began to chip away at the protections of the  
attorney–client privilege and work-product doctrines in 1999 when then-
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum entitled 
“Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations.”22 The Holder 
Memorandum, as it became known, identified eight factors that prosecutors 
were permitted to weigh in deciding whether to indict a corporation or 
provide cooperation credit, such as a DPA.23 The factor that was most relevant 
to the government’s decision was the corporation’s willingness to cooperate 
with the government during its investigation, which the Memo directly 
connected to the corporation’s decision to waive its attorney–client and work-
product doctrine privileges. The Holder Memorandum explained: 
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation’s 
timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate with the government’s investigation may be relevant 
factors. In gauging the extent of the corporation’s cooperation, the 
prosecutor may consider the corporation’s willingness to . . . disclose 
the complete results of its internal investigation, and to waive the 
attorney-client and work-product privileges.24  
The Holder Memorandum was the first step the DOJ took to gain access to 
corporate internal investigations. However, it was merely advisory.25 
In 2003, then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a 
memorandum to replace the Holder Memorandum entitled “Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” which became known as the 
Thompson Memorandum.26 The Thompson Memorandum was intended to 
“increase[] [the] emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a 
corporation’s cooperation.”27 Like its predecessor, the Thompson 
Memorandum provided that cooperation included waiving the  
attorney–client and work-product privileges.28 Although “[t]he Thompson 
 
 22. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All 
Component Heads & U.S. Att’ys (June 16, 1999) http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/ 
documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. 
 23. The eight factors include: (1) “[t]he nature and seriousness of the offense”; (2) the frequency 
of misconduct within the corporation; (3) the corporation’s history of engaging in comparable 
conduct; (4) “[t]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation of its agents”; (5) “[t]he existence and adequacy of the corporation’s 
compliance program”; (6) “[t]he corporation’s remedial actions”; (7) “[c]ollateral consequences”; and 
(8) “[t]he adequacy of non-criminal remedies.” Id. at II.A. 
 24. Id. at VI.A. 
 25. See generally id. 
 26. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Heads 
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003 
jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 27. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 26, at 1. 
 28. Id. at II.A.4, VI.A. 
A2_COPELAND (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017  11:40 PM 
1904 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:1897 
Memorandum . . . elevated the importance of waiver” in assessing cooperation,29 
it never specified the “appropriate circumstances” for requesting waiver.30 
Ultimately, this led to many prosecutors seeking waiver on a regular basis.31  
The Thompson Memorandum also instructed prosecutors to consider 
“the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the 
corporation’s malfeasance.”32 This was the first indication that the 
prosecution of the corporation was not necessarily the DOJ’s highest priority. 
The corporation’s cooperation was still incredibly important, however, 
because the DOJ needed the results of the corporation’s internal investigation 
to prosecute the responsible individuals within the corporation. Thus, the 
government was able to leverage the threat of corporate prosecution over the 
corporation to force them to cooperate with the government’s investigation.  
While the government was leveraging its indictment authority to 
convince corporations to cooperate and waive the corporate attorney–client 
privilege, it was also offering DPAs and NPAs as a reward for cooperation.33 
As explained above, a DPA is a compromise between a declination and 
pursuing criminal charges. It gives the DOJ the opportunity to enact 
meaningful reforms to the corporate culture in an effort to prevent future 
misconduct.34 A DPA typically involves the corporation paying a large fine and 
 
 29. See Katrice Bridges Copeland, Preserving the Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege, 78 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1199, 1213 (2010) (explaining that the Thompson Memorandum changed the wording 
of the Holder Memorandum to emphasize the importance of waiver of the attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protection). The memo also stopped referring to the attorney–client 
and work-product privileges as “privileges” and instead referred to them as “protections.” Id.  
 30. The Thompson Memorandum provided that prosecutors could request waiver of the 
attorney–client privilege and work-product protection in “appropriate circumstances.” Thompson 
Memorandum, supra note 26, at VI.B. The lack of guidance, however, on when the circumstances were 
“appropriate” for the prosecutor to request a waiver meant that some prosecutors believed that waiver 
was appropriate in nearly every case. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1214. 
 31. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1213–14.  
 32. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 26, at II.A.8. 
 33. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT 
SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 13 (2009). See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007).  
 34. Professor Harry First has explained that “there is no standard agreement,” but many of 
the agreements have some of the following conditions:  
(1) an internal investigation; (2) a code of conduct and/or an effective compliance 
program to “prevent or deter violations of the law”; (3) corporate acceptance of 
responsibility; (4) the provision of specified information to the government with 
“full candor and completeness”; (5) waivers of attorney-client and work-product 
protections; (6) dismissals of errant employees; (7) a continuing duty to cooperate; 
(8) payment of restitution and/or a fine; and (9) probation with the use of 
continuing monitors, whose duties depend on the extent of the remedial actions to 
which the corporation has agreed. 
Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime 
Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 47 (2010); see also Garrett, supra note 33, at 893–902 (providing 
a detailed analysis of terms incorporated into DPAs and NPAs). 
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enacting compliance measures to prevent misconduct from recurring in the 
future. Additionally, a DPA is filed with the court and stays on the judge’s 
docket until the term of the DPA is complete.35 An NPA, in contrast, has many 
of the same types of provisions as a DPA but is not filed with the court.36 
Therefore, so long as the corporation complies with the requirements of the 
NPA, the prosecution agrees not to file it with the court.37 With the rise in the 
use of DPAs and NPAs to resolve cases of corporate wrongdoing, the number 
of corporate prosecutions decreased dramatically.38   
Although the strategy of leveraging both the threat of prosecution 
and/or the availability of DPAs was successful at getting corporations to 
cooperate with government investigations by waiving the attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protection, it was not without criticism.  The 
biggest criticism, from both conservatives and liberals alike, was that the 
Thompson Memorandum created a “culture of waiver” where corporations 
had no choice but to waive the corporate attorney–client privilege and work-
product protections to be considered cooperators and save themselves from 
indictment.39 After a considerable amount of pressure and the threat of 
 
 35. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 33, at 11–12 (explaining that the 
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, gives the court authority to “approve the deferral of a 
prosecution pursuant to a written agreement between the government and the defendant”). 
Many scholars have criticized the fact that judges do not play an active role in the approval of a 
DPA. Nor do they determine whether the terms of the DPA have been violated. That is solely 
within the prosecutor’s discretion. See Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred 
Prosecutions: Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (There are not 
any “established policing mechanisms developed by the courts to oversee the agreements reached 
by the parties to a [DPA]. Thus, the government acquires total power over the alleged corporate 
offender. The net result is that deferred prosecution agreements are reached without considering 
theories of duress and unconscionability.” (footnote omitted)). However, in a recent case, a 
district court judge in the Eastern District of New York expressed greater willingness to scrutinize 
and monitor implementation of DPAs. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-
763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3–11 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (analyzing the terms of the DPA and 
reserving power to supervise implementation of the DPA).  
 36. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 33, at 11–12. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 13.  
 39. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 29, at 1210–20 (discussing the historical and legal 
background of the culture of waiver); Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation 
During Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 5–6 (2007) (noting that “as a practical 
matter companies have had no choice but to waive the privilege”); Earl J. Silbert & Demme 
Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the 
Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2006) (arguing that the pressure on 
corporations to waive the privilege undermines the adversarial nature of the justice system);  
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The 
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1172, 1179–80 (2006) (noting 
that defense lawyers often believed that waiver was required in order to avoid an indictment, and 
proposing possible reforms); Stephen Weigand, Comment, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege 
and Work-Product Protection from Thompson to McNulty: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 76 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1093, 1111–15 (2008) (discussing the criticisms and benefits of the shift away from the 
waiver of culture by the McNulty Memo). 
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legislation to protect the corporate attorney–client privilege, the DOJ 
ultimately changed its policy two times.40 The first change, the McNulty 
Memorandum,41 occurred in 2006 and put a process in place to make it more 
difficult for the government to request waiver of the attorney–client privilege 
and work-product protection.42 The legal community, however, continued to 
push the government to change the policy so that it no longer considered the 
waiver of the corporate attorney–client privilege when making a 
determination of whether a corporation sufficiently cooperated with the 
government’s investigation.43 Eventually, in 2008 the DOJ issued the Filip 
Guidelines, which were incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual,44 and completely eliminated waiver of the corporate attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protections as factors to consider when 
determining a corporation’s cooperation.45 Instead, the focus of the 
cooperation inquiry turned to whether the corporation had provided all of 
the relevant “facts” to the government.46 According to the Filip Guidelines, in 
providing factual information, “the corporation need not produce, and 
prosecutors may not request, protected notes or memoranda generated by 
the lawyers’ interviews.”47 Instead, the corporation must provide “relevant 
factual information acquired through those interviews” and business records 
and e-mails between employees and agents.48 
B. THE YATES MEMO 
The Yates Memo marks the first time that the DOJ changed the charging 
guidelines since 2008. In the time since the Filip Guidelines, the financial 
collapse occurred and new criticisms have been leveled at the DOJ for failing 
 
 40. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1236.  
 41. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Heads 
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Dec. 12 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf.  
 42. Id. at 8–11. The new procedure required a prosecutor to obtain written authorization 
from the U.S. Attorney before seeking a waiver to obtain “factual information” such as “copies of 
key documents, witness statements, or purely factual interview memoranda regarding the 
underlying misconduct, organization charts created by company counsel, factual chronologies, 
factual summaries, or reports (or portions thereof) containing investigative facts documented by 
counsel.” Id. at 9. If the prosecutor wanted additional attorney–client privileged or work-product 
protected documents, the prosecutor would have to “obtain written authorization from a Deputy 
Attorney General.” Id. at 10. 
 43. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1228.  
 44. 2008 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9, §§ 9-28.000 to 9-28.1300. 
 45. Id. § 9-28.720. 
 46. Id. (explaining that the typical inquiry will concern “how and when did the alleged 
misconduct occur? Who promoted or approved it? Who was responsible for committing it?”). 
 47. Id. § 9-28.720(a) n.3. 
 48. Id. 
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to hold individuals criminally accountable for corporate wrongdoing.49 
Consequently, the Yates Memo sets forth six steps that the DOJ should take to 
ensure individual accountability for corporate misconduct. It explains: 
(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must 
provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the 
individuals responsible for the misconduct; (2) criminal and civil 
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the 
inception of the investigation; (3) criminal and civil attorneys 
handling corporate investigations should be in routine 
communication with one another; (4) absent extraordinary 
circumstances or approved departmental policy, the Department 
will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability 
when resolving a matter with a corporation; (5) Department 
attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without a 
clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should 
memorialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and  
(6) civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as 
the company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual 
based on considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay.50 
The key provision for this Article is the first one, which requires 
employers to provide “all relevant facts” about the individuals involved in the 
misconduct before the company can “receive any consideration for 
cooperation” in the form of a DPA or NPA.51 Specifically, the Yates Memo 
explains  that “to be eligible for any credit for cooperation, the company must 
identify all individuals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, 
regardless of their position, status or seniority, and provide to the Department 
all facts relating to that misconduct.”52 Consequently, by making cooperation 
credit completely contingent on the corporation’s willingness to turn over 
culpable employees, the DOJ is once again leveraging the threat of 
prosecution to gain access to the corporation’s internal investigation and 
override the attorney–client privilege and work-product doctrine. 
Importantly, the Yates Memo also attempted to lessen the DOJ’s reliance on 
a corporation’s internal investigations when it explained that “Department 
attorneys should [not] wait for the company to deliver the information about 
individual wrongdoers and then merely accept what companies provide. To 
the contrary, Department attorneys should be proactively investigating 
individuals at every step of the process—before, during, and after any 
corporate cooperation.”53 At this early stage, however, it is unclear whether or 
 
 49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 50. Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 2–3.  
 51. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 4.  
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how prosecutors will aggressively pursue individuals without the assistance of 
the corporation.  
The Yates Memo’s failure to hold individuals criminally accountable 
without corporate, internal investigations is clear from the DOJ’s established 
“culture of waiver.”  This “culture of waiver” dictated that corporations would 
perform internal investigations, waive their corporate attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protection, and provide the results of the 
investigation to the DOJ in order to receive cooperation credit.54 Although 
the DOJ claims that the “culture of waiver” never existed, they did in fact 
change their corporate charging policy two times to erase references to 
waiving the corporate attorney–client privilege.55 While the Yates Memo does 
not explicitly reference the privilege, the current policy calls for corporations 
to turn over the relevant facts regarding individual culpability, without regard 
to whether those facts may have been a part of a privileged communication. 
Therefore, regardless of the language in their current charging policy, the 
DOJ is still very much reliant on the investigative work of corporate counsel. 
Whether corporations are “voluntarily” waiving the corporate attorney–client 
privilege to provide the DOJ with the facts or, per the Yates Memo, attempting 
to provide those facts without expressly waiving the privilege, the DOJ is still 
reaping the rewards of corporate counsel’s investigative efforts. Consequently, 
unless and until that dynamic changes, the Yates Memo’s directives will likely 
be ineffective.  
III. THE YATES MEMO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS FOR THE DOJ 
The specific guidance in the Yates Memo creates two problems that are 
inextricably linked. First, similar to the issues inherent in the previous 
guidelines, the Yates Memo relies upon the internal investigation of the 
corporation and is therefore an attack on the corporate attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protection. Second, it pits employers against 
employees, making it more difficult for counsel to conduct the internal 
investigation.56 The DOJ’s cooperation policy has always been problematic for 
both the relationship between employees and employers and the corporate 
 
 54. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 29, at 1210–20 (discussing the historical and legal 
background of the culture of waiver); Mark & Pearson, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that “as a 
practical matter companies have had no choice but to waive the privilege . . . .”); Silbert & 
Joannou, supra note 39, at 1229 (arguing that the pressure on corporations to waive the privilege 
undermines the adversarial nature of the justice system); Weigand, supra note 39, at 1111–15 
(discussing the criticisms and benefits of the shift away from the culture of waiver by the McNulty 
Memo); Wray & Hur, supra note 39, at 1172, 1179–80 (noting that defense lawyers often believed 
that waiver was required in order to avoid an indictment, and proposing possible reforms). 
 55. See generally 2008 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9; McNulty Memorandum, supra 
note 41. 
 56. The Yates Memo states that, “in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations 
must provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the 
misconduct.” Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 2. 
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attorney–client privilege.57 As previously explained, the DOJ’s past policy 
regarding cooperation forced corporations to waive the corporate  
attorney–client privilege and work-product protection in order to gain 
cooperation credit and receive lenient treatment in the form of a DPA or 
NPA.58 The expectation under those policies was that corporations would 
throw the culpable employees under the bus in order to save themselves from 
indictment. Additionally, by requiring waiver of the corporate attorney–client 
privilege and work-product protection before a corporation could receive 
cooperation credit, the DOJ was able to obtain the fruits of the internal 
investigation without the need to expend government resources.59 The DOJ 
effectively deputized defense counsel and co-opted their internal 
investigations.60  
As far as the employee–employer relationship is concerned, not only will 
the typical employee not understand that the corporation might choose to 
save itself by waiving the corporate attorney–client privilege, but the 
investigating attorney has no obligation to explain that the corporation might 
choose to cooperate with the government.61 Furthermore, employees are 
often warned that they must cooperate with the internal investigation or face 
termination.62 Unless there was already a grand jury subpoena requiring the 
testimony of the employee or the company had some reason to believe that 
the employee was involved in misconduct, the employee would not have her 
own counsel present at the interview to explain the implications of the 
warning given to the employee at the start of the interview.63 Finally, 
employees tend to not have a say in whether the corporation should waive the 
corporate attorney–client privilege, even if the employee incriminated herself 
during her interview with counsel.64 Each issue will now be considered in 
detail. 
 
 57. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1210–20. 
 58. See Copeland, supra note 29, at 1210–20 (explaining that the DOJ’s earlier policies, such 
as the Holder Memorandum and the Thompson Memorandum, explicitly required waiver of the 
corporate attorney-client privilege to demonstrate cooperation with the government); see also 
supra Part II. 
 59. See Copeland, supra note 29, at 1215 (explaining that the government could avoid the 
costs of “securing witness cooperation agreements or sifting through thousands of documents” 
by requiring waiver of the privilege). 
 60. See id. at 1216–17 (explaining that once corporate counsel knew that the corporation 
would waive the privilege corporate counsel was investigating with the purpose of reporting to 
the government). 
 61. Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness 
for Corporate Constituents, 54 B.C. L. REV. 73, 110–11 (2013) (explaining that ethics rules favor the 
corporation over the employee). 
 62. Id. at 99. 
 63. Id. at 100. 
 64. Id. at 101. 
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A. THE PROBLEM OF WAIVER 
With respect to cooperation, the 2008 corporate charging policy states 
that in deciding whether a corporation is entitled to cooperation credit, the 
government should consider, “the corporation’s willingness to provide 
relevant information and evidence and identify relevant actors within and 
outside the corporation, including senior executives.”65 As for the corporate 
attorney–client privilege, the 2008 policy explains that despite the fact that a 
“wide range of commentators and members of the American legal community 
and criminal justice system have asserted that the Department’s policies have 
been used, either wittingly or unwittingly, to coerce business entities into 
waiving attorney–client [sic] privilege and work-product protection,” such 
waiver has “never been a prerequisite . . . for a corporation to be viewed as 
cooperative.”66 However, notwithstanding the DOJ’s denial that waiver of the 
corporate attorney–client privilege is or ever was a prerequisite for 
cooperation credit, the current policy under the Yates Memo still calls for 
disclosure of all of the relevant facts gathered through the corporation’s 
internal investigation.67   
Specifically, although “facts” are not privileged,68 it is not at all clear how 
a corporation provides those facts regarding culpable individuals without 
revealing the substance of an attorney–client communication, thereby waiving 
the corporate attorney–client privilege.69 The current charging policy 
suggests that corporations conduct their internal investigations without 
lawyers.70 It seems unlikely, however, that a corporation would do so given 
 
 65. 2008 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 9, § 9-28.700.  
 66. Id. § 9-28.710.  
 67. Id. § 9-28.720.  
 68. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981) (explaining that the 
attorney-client privilege’s protections apply to communications, but not to the underlying facts). 
 69. See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining the circumstances under which the attorney–client 
privilege is waived). 
 70. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 8, § 9-28.720(a). In making the case that 
cooperation credit does not depend on whether the documents are protected by the  
attorney–client or work-product protections, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual states: 
Individuals and corporations often obtain knowledge of facts in different ways. An 
individual knows the facts of his or others’ misconduct through his own experience 
and perceptions. A corporation is an artificial construct that cannot, by definition, 
have personal knowledge of the facts. Some of those facts may be reflected in 
documentary or electronic media like emails, transaction or accounting documents, 
and other records. Often, the corporation gathers facts through an internal 
investigation. Exactly how and by whom the facts are gathered is for the corporation 
to decide. Many corporations choose to collect information about potential 
misconduct through lawyers, a process that may confer attorney-client privilege or 
attorney work product protection on at least some of the information collected. 
Other corporations may choose a method of fact-gathering that does not have that 
effect—for example, having employee or other witness statements collected after 
interviews by non-attorney personnel. Whichever process the corporation selects, the 
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that corporations are not protected by the Fifth Amendment thereby limiting 
their ability to withhold any corporate documents from disclosure.71 
Consequently, the corporate attorney–client privilege is the only protection 
that corporations have during a government investigation. By specifically 
requiring that corporations turn over information about culpable employees 
before receiving any consideration for cooperation credit, the Yates memo 
magnifies the problem of waiver present in the previous policies.  
1. When is the Attorney–Client Privilege Waived? 
  The attorney–client privilege ensures that communications between 
clients and their attorneys for the purpose of securing legal advice will remain 
confidential.72 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he attorney-client 
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications 
known to the common law.”73 The purpose of the privilege is “to protect not 
 
government’s key measure of cooperation must remain the same as it does for an 
individual: has the party timely disclosed the relevant facts about the putative 
misconduct? That is the operative question in assigning cooperation credit for the 
disclosure of information—not whether the corporation discloses attorney-client or 
work product materials. Accordingly, a corporation should receive the same credit 
for disclosing facts contained in materials that are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege or attorney work product as it would for disclosing identical facts 
contained in materials that are so protected. 
Id. 
 71. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105, 123 (1988) (interpreting Hale to mean 
that a corporation does not possess the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–78 (1906) (finding that the custodian of records 
for a corporation could not refuse to produce corporate documents pursuant to a subpoena on 
Fifth Amendment grounds).  
 72. In United States v. Jones, the Fourth Circuit described the “classic test” for the  
attorney–client privilege:  
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to 
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a 
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this 
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which 
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers  
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal 
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of 
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not 
waived by the client. 
United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950)).  
 73. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that the attorney–client privilege applies to corporations. See id. at 
389–90 (“Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a 
corporation, which in theory is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; but this 
Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation, and the 
Government does not contest the general proposition.” (citation omitted)). It held that, in the 
context of an internal investigation, conversations between counsel and mid-, or even low-level, 
employees were protected by the corporate attorney–client privilege so long as they were for the 
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only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the 
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed 
advice.”74  
The attorney–client privilege does not just protect oral communications; 
it also protects documents that memorialize those communications.75  Thus, 
there is no question that documents produced during an internal 
investigation for the purpose of giving legal advice to the corporation, such as 
witness interview memoranda and internal investigation reports that contain 
communications between corporate counsel and corporate employees, are 
protected by the corporate attorney–client privilege.76 The underlying facts, 
however, are not privileged.77 Therefore, if the government has some other 
means of discovering those facts, such as conducting its own interviews of 
employees, the client cannot raise the attorney–client privilege to prevent the 
government from learning those facts.78 In Upjohn, for instance, the Supreme 
Court explained that the “[a]pplication of the attorney–client [sic] privilege 
to communications such as those involved [in an internal investigation] . . . 
puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never 
taken place.”79 However, as Professor Timothy P. Glynn has explained, “[t]he 
attorney-client privilege is a mess.”80 The rules regarding the protection 
afforded by the privilege and when that protection has been waived vary 
within and between states as well as within and between federal circuits.81 This 
 
purpose of securing legal advice for the corporation. Id. at 392–93. The Court rejected the 
“control group test” of the Court of Appeals that, in short, the privilege applies only to upper-
level management’s communications to attorneys. Id. at 390–93. The Court explained, inter alia, 
that such a standard “frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the 
communication of relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render 
legal advice to the client corporation.” Id. at 392. 
 74. Id. at 390. “It is now well established that the privilege attaches not only to 
communications by the client to the attorney, but also to advice rendered by the attorney to the 
client, at least to the extent that such advice may reflect confidential information conveyed by 
the client.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437, 441–42 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
 75. JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL LEGAL INFORMATION, SN009 ALI-
ABA 549 I.A.1 (2007). 
 76. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401–02; SOLOVY ET AL., supra note 75 (“The broad sweep of 
privileged communications encompasses not only oral communications, but also documents or 
other records in which communications have been recorded.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 2016)); JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK 
ON EVIDENCE § 89 (5th ed. 1999); 24 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5484 (1st ed. 2017). 
 77. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96. 
 78. The individual may, however, be able to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. See id. Despite this individual protection, the individual may not assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege on behalf of the corporation. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 
104–10 (1988) (explaining the legal history of the “collective entity doctrine”). 
 79. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395. 
 80. Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 60 (2002). 
 81. Id. at 98–121 (discussing some of the many disagreements between jurisdictions). 
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variation leads to a great deal of uncertainty in the application of the 
attorney–client privilege.82       
Nevertheless, because many courts view it as an impediment to the truth, 
the attorney–client privilege is strictly construed by the courts and they 
examine whether all of the requirements for the privilege are met.83 One 
requirement that receives considerable attention is whether the 
communication between the attorney and client was confidential or intended 
to be confidential.84 The issue of confidentiality and waiver can sometimes 
intersect, as it is a fundamental principle that “[a]ny disclosure inconsistent 
with maintaining the confidential nature of the attorney–client relationship 
waives the attorney–client privilege.”85 Therefore, in some situations the court 
will find that the attorney–client privilege never attached because the 
communication was not confidential or intended to be confidential, while in 
other cases the court will find that the attorney–client privilege was waived 
due to a disclosure that destroyed confidentiality.86    
 
 82. See supra Part II. 
 83. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (“Testimonial exclusionary rules and 
privileges contravene the fundamental principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s 
evidence.’”(quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (omission in original))).  
 84. See id. at 45 (“In 1953 the Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, followed a similar course; it limited the 
privilege to confidential communications and ‘abolishe[d] the rule, still existing in some states, 
and largely a sentimental relic, of not requiring one spouse to testify against the other in a 
criminal action.’” (alteration in original)). 
 85. United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). The court goes on to 
explain that: “Any voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party waives the privilege not only 
as to the specific communication disclosed, but often as to all other communications relating to 
the same subject matter.” Id. (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 808–09 (D.C. Cir.1982)). 
 86. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (explaining 
that the attorney–client privilege “does not apply to the situation where it is the intention or 
understanding of the client that the communication is to be made known to others”); United 
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that disclosure of certain 
documents destroyed the confidentiality of those documents and any claim to the attorney–client 
privilege); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38–39 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that the 
presence of a third party during the meeting between the attorney and client destroyed the 
privilege because the communication was not confidential); see also EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 390–91 (5th ed. 2007). 
The existence of the privilege and its waiver are analytically distinguishable, 
although similar circumstances may give rise to a judicial determination that the 
privilege never attached in the first instance, or that although it attached, it has been 
waived. Disclosure of the privileged communication to third persons at the time of 
the communication may prevent the creation of the privilege. The necessary 
element of confidentiality will be found to be lacking. Disclosure to third persons 
after the making of an otherwise privileged communication may constitute a waiver 
of the privilege. The effect is the same: There is no privilege because disclosure was 
intended or has in fact occurred. The analysis of why the privilege does not apply, 
however, is best kept distinct. 
Id. 
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With respect to waiver of the attorney–client privilege, a disclosure of 
attorney–client communications to one party waives the privilege as to all 
other parties.87 This includes situations where a corporation waives the 
privilege in order to gain cooperation credit with the government. As the 
privilege is strictly construed, waiver of the privilege can be express, implied, 
or even inadvertent.88 In cases involving express waiver, the corporation’s 
management makes a conscious choice to waive the corporate attorney–client 
privilege.89    
Waiver of the attorney–client privilege may also be implied. There are 
two circumstances where an implied waiver of the privilege may occur. “The 
attorney-client privilege may be waived ‘by placing the subject matter of 
counsel’s advice in issue or by making selective disclosure of only part of such 
advice.’”90 This prevents a client from using the attorney–client privilege as 
both a sword and a shield. For example, if a client claims that she acted in 
good faith on the reliance of counsel’s advice, she cannot then refuse to 
produce the attorney–client communications related to that advice.  
Waiver of the attorney–client privilege, however, is not always express or 
implied based on the circumstances. Waiver may also occur if the client or the 
client’s counsel inadvertently discloses attorney–client communications.91 
Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), unintentional disclosure of 
privileged materials does not result in waiver of the privilege only if “(1) the 
disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took 
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took 
reasonable steps to rectify the error.”92 However, while there are clearly 
protections in place to avoid inadvertent waiver, it is certainly possible that a 
court may find that a corporation inadvertently waived its corporate  
attorney–client privilege by disclosing the “facts” to the government. For 
example, a court may be faced with a situation where a corporation attempted 
to cooperate with the government by disclosing the facts that counsel learned 
 
 87. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 
(6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the doctrine of selective waiver because it would transform the 
attorney-client privilege into a tool to be used for strategic advantage against various opponents). 
 88. See EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 391 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327 (McNaughton 
rev. 1961)) (“A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon 
could alone control the situation. There is always also the objective consideration that when his 
conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that the [sic] privilege shall cease 
whether he intended that result or not.”).  
 89. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) 
(explaining that the power to waive the privilege is typically exercised by officers and directors 
“in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.”). 
 90. James P. McLoughlin, Jr. et al., Navigating Implied Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege After 
Adoption of Federal Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693,  
724–25 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting Soho Generation v. Tri–City Ins. Brokers, 653 
N.Y.S.2d 924, 925 (App. Div. 1997)).  
 91. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 92. Id. 
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from an employee interview. In that situation, the court may find that because 
the attorney knows the “facts” about the subject through the client’s 
communications, disclosure of those “facts” necessarily reveals the content of 
the attorney–client communication. Therefore, the disclosure of the “facts” 
would constitute a waiver of the attorney–client privilege.  
2. The Problems of Waiver in the Yates Memo 
There are two related questions concerning the viability of the corporate 
attorney–client privilege and the Yates Memo. The first question is whether 
the corporate attorney–client privilege applies to the internal investigation 
when there is an expectation that the results of that investigation will be 
shared with the government. In other words, is there an expectation of 
confidentiality? Second, if the corporate attorney–client privilege does apply 
to the internal investigation, does a corporation either expressly or 
inadvertently waive the privilege by complying with the Yates Memo’s 
requirement to provide all of the facts about culpable employees? 
As previously explained, “when material is conveyed to an attorney with 
the intention, knowledge, or expectation that the attorney will incorporate 
the matter so conveyed directly or indirectly into a disclosure to third parties, 
the requisite intention of confidentiality is lacking ab initio.”93 Therefore, 
there is a real danger that courts may find that the attorney–client privilege 
does not attach to documents prepared pursuant to an internal investigation 
if the company intends to comply with the Yates Memo and divulge 
information learned during the investigation about culpable employees to the 
government. So long as the corporation actually shares the information about 
culpable employees with the DOJ,94 a subsequent court may find that the 
corporate attorney–client privilege never attached to any aspect of the 
internal investigation because there was never an expectation of 
confidentiality. Thus, interview memoranda and other documents created 
during the internal investigation may end up discoverable by third parties.        
Even if the court were to find that there was an expectation of privacy, 
and that the attorney–client privilege therefore attached to the internal 
investigation, there would still be the question of whether the corporation 
waived the privilege by divulging facts about culpable employees. Although 
“facts” are not privileged, in the context of an internal investigation, the facts 
learned from employees would not be known but for the attorney–client 
 
 93. EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 246. 
 94. Id. at 247 (“A client, however, may convey information to an attorney with the initial 
intention that the information will be conveyed to third parties and thereafter change his or her 
mind. In such a case, it is the subsequent intention of confidentiality rather than the initial 
intention of disclosure that would prevail, provided no disclosure had in fact been made.”); see 
United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875–76 (4th Cir. 1984) (explaining “that if a client 
communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be 
revealed to others” then the privilege does not attach to that communication). 
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communication. Specifically, the attorney conducting the internal 
investigation ultimately becomes a repository of information and she will put 
a lot of the facts that she learns into interview memoranda and other 
documents created during the internal investigation. The decision to later 
provide those facts to the government would be a strategic one to save the 
corporation from indictment. Realistically speaking, therefore, there is no way 
to divulge these facts without revealing the attorney–client communication. 
The issue that a court would need to decide, however, is whether that is 
enough to find either an express or inadvertent waiver of the corporate 
attorney–client privilege. In addition, if the court were to find that waiver had 
occurred, would it be a partial waiver or would it waive the privilege with 
respect to all materials of the same subject matter?   
It is not clear how a court would rule on these issues. In addition, it may 
be a long time before this type of issue makes its way to a court because these 
issues arise pre-indictment. Specifically, a company would have to go along 
with the requirements of the Yates Memo and then have their corporate 
attorney–client privilege challenged in a subsequent case by a third party 
before the issue would be squarely before a court. As noted above, the danger 
here is in the uncertainty and the potential for a lack of uniformity in courts’ 
rulings. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n uncertain privilege . . . is 
little better than no privilege at all.”95 If there is uncertainty around the 
application of the corporate attorney–client privilege, it may discourage the 
free flow of information and make it more difficult for counsel to provide 
good legal advice.96  
B. THE PROBLEMS IN EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS 
Because corporations often cooperate with the government and share 
the results of their investigations, for many years, a typical criticism of the 
corporate internal investigation has been that lawyers conducting the 
investigation are in essence government agents.97 For employees of the 
corporation, this means that the government could bring criminal charges 
 
 95. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).  
 96. Glynn, supra note 80, at 74 (explaining that in order “for society to reap benefits from 
the privilege, it must afford sufficiently certain protection for attorney-client communications”). 
 97. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 29, at 1211 (observing that the government could 
piggyback off of the efforts of the corporation’s outside counsel by obtaining the results of 
internal investigations); Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, 
Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 865 (2003) (explaining 
that employees are unaware that corporate counsel may be acting as a “de facto government 
agent[]”); First, supra note 34, at 48 (explaining that the use of DPAs “have further shifted the 
role of corporations in the criminal process from criminal target to prosecutorial agent”); Green 
& Podgor, supra note 61, at 78–79 (“When corporate criminal conduct exists, corporate counsel’s 
allegiance to the entity translates into an investigation that is minimally independent and more 
practically an investigation to accumulate evidence that the government cannot obtain from the 
corporation without trading leniency for the corporation’s waiver of privilege.”). 
A2_COPELAND (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017  11:40 PM 
2017] THE YATES MEMO 1917 
against them based on information provided by the corporation that would 
otherwise be protected by the corporate attorney–client privilege.98 
Furthermore, as the employees of the corporation are not the attorney’s 
client,99 there has always been tension for the attorney between serving the 
interests of the client (i.e. avoiding indictment of the corporation by any 
means necessary) and the ethical obligation not to mislead employees during 
interviews. That tension is clearly exacerbated by the Yates Memo, which states 
that, “in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must 
provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals 
responsible for the misconduct.”100 Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
appropriate warning that corporate counsel should provide prior to 
interviewing employees. 
Internal investigations are incredibly important and useful tools for 
corporations. By conducting an internal investigation, the corporation can 
determine whether misconduct occurred, who committed the misconduct, 
and the potential liability that the corporation may face as a result of that 
misconduct. Furthermore, the corporation can determine how it will defend 
itself against any potential charges. As noted above, typically corporate 
counsel conducts the internal investigation on behalf of the corporation.101 
By doing so, the results of the internal investigation are protected by the 
corporate attorney–client privilege.102 As part of the internal investigation, 
corporate counsel will gather and review relevant documents and interview 
employees who may have knowledge of the relevant issue.  
When corporate counsel conducts an employee interview, she provides a 
fairly standard disclaimer to the employee that has been termed the “Upjohn 
Warning.”103 Under this doctrine, the attorney must explain to the employee 
that: (1) the attorney has been hired by the corporation to investigate and 
provide legal advice on a specific matter; (2) the attorney represents the 
corporation, not the employee individually; (3) the interview is protected by 
the corporation’s attorney–client privilege; (4) it is the corporation’s right to 
waive the attorney–client privilege; and (5) the corporation expects the 
employee to keep the interview confidential.104 By giving that warning, 
corporate counsel has fulfilled her ethical duty under the Model Rules of 
 
 98. Duggin, supra note 97, at 864–65. 
 99. Green & Podgor, supra note 61, at 107–09. 
 100. Yates Memo, supra note 7, at 2.  
 101. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Recommended Practices for Companies and Their Counsel in 
Conducting Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 95 n.67 (2009) (explaining that 
although Upjohn itself did not deal with the question of warnings, “Upjohn Warnings have [been 
used to make] clear to Constituents that the corporation, and the corporation alone, is the holder 
of the privilege”). See generally Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
 104. Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 103, at 95–96.  
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Professional Conduct105 to clarify that she does not represent the 
employees.106 Furthermore, by providing that blanket warning to each 
employee before an interview, counsel does not need to determine ahead of 
time whether the interests of the corporation are adverse to the interests of 
the employee.107 However, as Professors Bruce Green and Ellen Podgor so 
eloquently put it, “[o]nce the lawyers have clarified their role, the ethics rules 
do not forbid them from developing and taking advantage of individuals’ 
expectation that the corporation’s interests are aligned with their own and 
that the corporation, including its lawyers, will protect them.”108 This is 
because internal investigations are unregulated.109 The chief concern, 
therefore, is that unsophisticated employees will tell all of their misdeeds to 
corporate counsel because they do not understand that it is often in the 
corporation’s best interest to throw the employees under the bus in order to 
save itself.110 Furthermore, it is important to note that corporate counsel is 
not required to inform employees that the corporation may choose to 
cooperate with the government and waive the attorney–client privilege, which 
could lead to criminal charges against the employees.111 Additionally, once 
the corporation decides to waive the corporate attorney–client privilege and 
share the results of the internal investigation with the government (as the 
Yates Memo essentially requires), the employees are virtually powerless to 
prevent the corporation from divulging their incriminating statements.112 
 
 105. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar. 
org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2017). Since that time, most states have adopted the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct as models for their ethics rules. Id.   
 106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). Rule 1.13(a) 
states: “A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting 
through its duly authorized constituents.” Id.  
 107. See id. r. 1.13(f). Rule 1.13(f) states: “In dealing with an organization’s directors, 
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the 
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization’s 
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.” Id. 
 108. Green & Podgor, supra note 61, at 75. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. (explaining that “individuals with little or no legal training, and unaware of the 
ramifications and personal consequences, readily cooperate in providing information to 
corporate lawyers . . . even when the corporation is already assisting government prosecutors or 
regulators in their investigation of corporate employees or anticipates doing so in exchange for 
leniency”).  
 111. Id. 
 112. In order for a corporate employee to prevent disclosure of her communications with 
corporate counsel, the employee has to convince the court that she had a reasonable belief that 
counsel was representing the employee individually. To assert the privilege, the employee must 
show that five factors exist. See In re Bevill, 805 F.2d 120, 123–25 (3d Cir. 1986). The Bevill test, 
which many circuits have adopted, requires: 
First, [employees] must show they approached [counsel] for the purpose of seeking 
A2_COPELAND (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2017  11:40 PM 
2017] THE YATES MEMO 1919 
Even though the government is often the recipient of the information 
from the internal investigation, the investigation is not subject to the rules 
that would apply if the government were conducting the investigation itself.113 
Thus, employees do not have a right to counsel or a Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination because an employee interview during an internal 
investigation is not a government interrogation.114 Further complicating this 
dynamic is the fact that corporations may threaten to fire employees who 
refuse to cooperate with the internal investigation.115 Thus, employees may 
cooperate with the internal investigation and incriminate themselves because 
they are afraid of losing their jobs. Unfortunately, those employees do not 
necessarily understand that their statements to counsel could be turned over 
to the government and lead to criminal charges. This issue is heightened due 
to the fact that, as previously stated, counsel has no ethical obligation to 
inform employees that they may decide to cooperate with the government’s 
investigation. 
With the new Yates Memo rule that the corporation must turn over 
culpable employees or receive no cooperation credit, it seems unfathomable 
that the ethical duty of corporate counsel ends with the Upjohn warning. 
Although there is zero ambiguity about the fact that the interests of the 
corporation and the interests of the individual employees are out of 
alignment, the Upjohn warning makes clear that the corporation is the client, 
and that is all that is required by Rule 1.13(f) of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.116 Importantly, Rule 4.3 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct may be applicable here. Rule 4.3 says that when a lawyer 
is dealing with an unrepresented person (likely the case when an employee is 
being interviewed) and “the lawyer knows or reasonably should know” that 
 
legal advice. Second, they must demonstrate that when they approached [counsel] 
they made it clear that they were seeking legal advice in their individual rather than 
in their representative capacities. Third, they must demonstrate that the [counsel] 
saw fit to communicate with them in their individual capacities, knowing that a 
possible conflict could arise. Fourth, they must prove that their conversations with 
[counsel] were confidential. And, fifth, they must show that the substance of their 
conversations with [counsel] did not concern matters within the company or the 
general affairs of the company. 
Id. at 123 (second and subsequent alterations in original) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation 
No. 83–30557, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983); see also Lawton P. Cummings, The Ethical 
Mine Field: Corporate Internal Investigations and Individual Assertions of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 109 
W. VA. L. REV. 669, 669–70, 679 (2007) (explaining that many employees who participate 
internal investigations are operating under the false impression that corporate counsel represents 
them individually and that they have a say in whether information counsel learned during the 
interview will be disclosed to the government). 
 113. Green & Podgor, supra note 61, at 78. 
 114. Id. at 87 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). 
 115. Id.; see also United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(explaining that KPMG fired employees who refused to cooperate). 
 116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
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there is a misunderstanding with respect to the lawyer’s role, “the lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”117 Furthermore, it 
provides that the only legal advice that an attorney representing a party can 
give to an unrepresented person is the advice to obtain legal counsel.118 The 
Comment to Rule 4.3 explains that “[i]n order to avoid a misunderstanding, 
a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer’s client and, where necessary, 
explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented 
person.”119 Thus, the question becomes whether corporate counsel must give 
some additional warning to employees before interviewing them or even tell 
them that they should secure their own attorneys. However, the Model Rules 
and commentary simply do not do enough to address the unique issues 
involved in internal investigations, especially those conducted under the new 
Yates Memo.  
While it may not be directly required by the rules, it seems that an early 
assessment of the potential for conflicts when operating under the Yates 
Memo means that every employee needs her own attorney. In the past, 
attorneys may have been able to convince employees that the corporation was 
on their side, but under the Yates Memo, the best interests of the corporation 
and those of the employees are antithetical to one another. It is always difficult 
to assess conflicts at an early stage, but in the past, corporate attorneys would 
examine the documents concerning a particular employee and any prior 
statements by other employees to make a decision about whether or not a 
conflict existed prior to interviewing the employee.120 In the absence of clear 
red flags in the documents or a grand jury subpoena requiring the employee 
to testify, corporate counsel would typically determine that a conflict did not 
exist and would proceed with interviewing the employee.121 If, however, 
something came up during the interview that demonstrated a clear conflict, 
counsel would stop the interview and advise the employee to obtain her own 
 
 117. Id. r. 4.3. Rule 4.3 states: 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a 
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the 
lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the 
misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented 
person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility 
of being in conflict with the interests of the client.  
Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at cmt. 1.  
 120. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, supra note 103, at 93–94 (explaining that interviews 
should begin after counsel has reviewed the relevant documents and that it may sometimes be 
necessary for an employee to have separate legal counsel before being interviewed if the 
employee has or appears to have “interests adverse to the Company”). 
 121. See id. 
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counsel.122 In many situations, the corporation would pay for the employee’s 
attorney.123  
After the Yates Memo, however, there is no real need to assess whether a 
potential conflict between the interests of the corporation and the interests 
of the employee exists. The government’s issuance of the Yates Memo frames 
the scenario such that the employees are nothing more than potential 
bargaining chips in the hands of the corporation. If the corporation has any 
intention whatsoever of complying with the Yates Memo and turning over 
culpable employees, or even if the corporation is just considering it, there can 
be no doubt that a conflict exists. The question therefore becomes what level 
of warning is necessary to make employees aware of the conflict between them 
and the interests of the corporation. One possibility is that corporate counsel 
could, as part of the Upjohn warning, explain to the employee that in order 
for a corporation to receive leniency for any wrongdoing, the corporation 
must cooperate by turning over information about culpable employees. 
Therefore, if the corporation determines that the employee has engaged in 
wrongdoing then the corporation will turn that information over to the 
government, which could result in criminal charges. That type of warning 
would clearly lay out the potential conflict for the employee and the employee 
would understand the potential pitfalls of cooperating with the internal 
investigation. At the same time, however, it seems that any employee, whether 
culpable or not, would be scared by that warning and may decide not to speak 
with corporate counsel. Such a result would frustrate the internal 
investigation process. Of course, the corporation could still threaten to fire 
non-cooperating employees. However, in this context that would seem to add 
fuel to the fire that corporate counsel is acting as a government agent and 
that the employees should have the same rights they would have if they were 
being interviewed by the government.124 
The other potential warning would be to instruct all employees that they 
need their own attorney before participating in the internal investigation. 
This is a bit more direct in that it does not rely on the employee to draw her 
own conclusion about what it means for the corporation to have interests that 
are opposed to the individual. Again, however, this would likely slow down the 
internal investigation or bring it to a swift conclusion. To begin with, 
 
 122. See id. at 94 (explaining that there is no need for separate legal counsel for employees 
until “adversity becomes sufficiently clear, or until an employee makes a reasonable request for 
separate counsel”). 
 123. Id.; see also United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 355–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting 
KPMG’s longstanding policy of paying its employees’ legal fees). 
 124. Abbe David Lowell & Christopher D. Man, Federalizing Corporate Internal Investigations and 
the Erosion of Employees’ Fifth Amendment Rights, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, iii–v,  
xxix–xxx (2011) (arguing that the government should not be able to circumvent Constitutional 
rights that would constrain its conduct by compelling the corporation to do it instead, and 
arguing that such Constitutional restrictions should apply during interviews and internal 
investigations). 
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employees are going to be worried about the fact that they need counsel. 
Second, they will be concerned about how to pay for their own counsel. If the 
corporation opts to pay for their employees’ counsel, it will greatly increase 
the cost of the internal investigation. Furthermore, some employees may not 
trust corporation-provided counsel even if the attorney explains that she 
represents the interests of the employee and not the corporation.  Third, once 
counsel is present at the interviews, there may be many questions that counsel 
instructs the employee not to answer. Therefore, the employees may not give 
corporate counsel the critical information that it needs to determine whether 
or not misconduct occurred and who may be responsible for that misconduct. 
Similar to the suggestion above, corporate counsel may try to strong arm the 
employees into answering questions by threatening to fire them for failure to 
cooperate with an internal investigation. For an employee who has engaged 
in wrongdoing, this leaves her in the cruel trilemma of confessing the 
wrongdoing and being subject to criminal prosecution when the corporation 
turns over that testimony to the government, lying about the misconduct, or 
losing her job. Even if the employee did not engage in any wrongdoing, she 
may be hesitant to speak with corporate counsel in a situation where the 
interests of the corporation and those of the employees are not aligned in any 
way. 
Either option—giving a more extensive warning about the conflict or 
advising the employee to obtain her own counsel—will greatly frustrate the 
progress of the internal investigation and it will be more difficult for corporate 
counsel to gather the information that is necessary to properly advise the 
corporation. Furthermore, it will make it more difficult to cooperate with the 
government as employees will understand that they are nothing more than 
bargaining chips to be used at the discretion of the corporation to save itself. 
Due to the significant drawbacks from the Yates Memo, there needs to be a 
different approach to holding individuals accountable that does not rely upon 
the corporation performing the investigation and turning over the results to 
the government. 
IV. THE YATES MEMO IS NOT THE ANSWER 
Holding individuals responsible for corporate crimes has consistently 
been a difficult issue. As Professor Brandon Garrett has observed, “[d]espite 
the remarkable access prosecutors can obtain from companies, prosecutors 
still often do not succeed in holding individuals accountable.”125 
Furthermore, he notes that even when the government pursues individuals, 
they are often lower-level employees rather than higher-up individuals.126 
 
 125. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal As Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1794 
(2015) (explaining that in theory it should be easier to bring prosecutions against individuals 
with the corporation’s cooperation). He further explains that the individual prosecutions have 
led to many dismissals and acquittals because they are difficult cases to win. Id. at 1808.  
 126. Id. at 1794–95. 
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Thus, the critical question for the government is whether the Yates Memo 
does anything to change that dynamic. In other words, if the goal is to obtain 
convictions of high-level officials, will the Yates Memo help the government 
to achieve that goal? Finally, and perhaps more importantly, is it the correct 
law enforcement approach for obtaining individual accountability?   
This Part argues that the Yates Memo does not provide a big enough 
incentive for corporations to implicate their high-level executives in 
misconduct. In addition, it argues that in order to respect the boundaries 
between the defense and prosecution function, the government must conduct 
its own investigation into corporate misconduct rather than relying on the 
corporation’s investigation. Furthermore, if the government conducts its own 
investigation into corporate wrongdoing, the problems with the  
attorney–client privilege are greatly diminished.  Finally, this Part argues that 
a legislative solution is necessary to ensure individual accountability. 
A. THE GOVERNMENT MUST CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATION 
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the policy changes in the Yates Memo 
will lead to an increase in criminal convictions of high-level corporate 
executives. This is because the Yates Memo is still relying upon the same 
method of resolving cases—DPAs with corporations and possible prosecutions 
of individuals based on corporate cooperation.127 Professor Garrett, who has 
extensively studied the data on the relationship between DPAs and individual 
prosecutions, explains that:  
[W]e are not likely to see any sharp change[s] in the trend, unless 
prosecutors change their priorities and approaches towards these 
cases. Prosecutors may say that they now focus on holding 
individuals accountable, but more evidence will have to support any 
claim that there is actually some new trend towards doing so.128   
The fact is that the incentive to cooperate by providing information 
about high-level culpable employees does not change significantly due to the 
Yates Memo. The reward for cooperation is still a DPA or NPA for the 
corporation129 and the corporation still pays a fine and agrees to compliance 
measures in exchange for the DOJ declining to prosecute the corporation.130 
There is nothing in the Yates Memo to suggest that the requirements of the 
DPA would be any less onerous, either in the form of a lower fine or less 
stringent compliance requirements, in exchange for providing information 
about culpable high-level executives. Nor is there any reason to believe that 
the prosecution of those high-level executives would be more successful under 
 
 127. Id. at 1803–04 (explaining that the data from 2001 to 2014 shows that the uptick in 
DPAs has not been accompanied by an increase in the number of individual prosecutions).  
 128. Id. at 1804. 
 129. U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, supra note 7, § 9-28.200. 
 130. Id. 
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the Yates Memo than prior to its existence. Specifically, the same problems 
that have plagued those prosecutions in the past would still exist. As Professor 
Garrett has noted, responsibility within a corporation can be diffused and it 
can be difficult to point the finger at a particular individual.131  
Importantly, even if one were to assume, arguendo, that the Yates Memo 
would lead to more successful prosecutions of upper-level employees, that 
does not necessarily mean that it is the correct law enforcement approach. 
One of the principal problems with the government’s approach to corporate 
crime is that the government expects the corporation to police itself. The 
notion that the corporation should perform the prosecutor’s function of 
investigating, identifying, and providing evidence against the wrongdoer 
within the corporation is ludicrous. Defense counsel’s job is to perform an 
internal investigation to determine whether wrongdoing occurred and, if 
such wrongdoing occurred, advise the corporation how to respond to it 
internally or defend itself against any potential charges. It is inappropriate for 
the government to delegate its prosecutorial function to corporations. 
Although white collar crime and street crimes are certainly different, it is hard 
to imagine a situation where a prosecutor would ask and rely upon defense 
counsel to conduct a murder investigation and provide evidence against her 
client.  
If the government truly wants to achieve individual accountability, it must 
therefore conduct its own investigations from start to finish, rather than 
relying upon the corporation’s internal investigation. From a practical 
perspective, the corporation may turn over a scapegoat rather than a high-
level executive. Furthermore, due to the longstanding culture of waiver of the 
corporate attorney–client privilege and work-product protection, corporate 
counsel may not write everything that she learns down on paper.132 Ultimately, 
that means that the government may not get the full story from the 
corporation’s internal investigation. Therefore, the over-reliance on 
corporate internal investigations as the principal means of achieving law 
enforcement goals needs to end. It is in the public interest to have these types 
of investigations conducted by the government so that the rights of both the 
corporation and the individuals are protected. Specifically, corporate counsel 
will be able to conduct a thorough investigation with full cooperation from 
employees without concern about waiver of the attorney–client privilege or 
work-product protection. Furthermore, if the government conducts the 
investigation, employees will be entitled to an attorney for their conversation 
with the government and will be able to assert their Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination without being put in the position of 
potentially losing their jobs.  Ultimately, this will permit defense counsel to go 
 
 131. Garrett, supra note 125, at 1824. 
 132. Glynn, supra note 80, at 76–81. 
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back to its job of defending corporations rather than working on behalf of the 
government.     
Admittedly, there is no doubt that this is a costlier approach, on the part 
of the government, to obtain individual accountability. The government will 
have to use its own resources to review documents, identify individuals to 
interview, conduct those interviews, and in some cases grant immunity in 
order to obtain incriminating information on high-level executives. 
Importantly, however, while it may be more difficult to obtain information in 
the corporate context, the government’s ability to make deals for information 
is no different than in street crime cases and can be used effectively.                     
The alternative approach detailed above of providing employees with 
additional warnings about the ramifications of cooperating with the internal 
investigation makes it more difficult for corporate counsel to learn critical 
information that it needs to advise the corporation. Or, even worse, if 
corporate counsel discloses the fact that the corporation intends to cooperate 
by turning over all information about culpable employees as required in the 
Yates Memo, the internal investigation may come to a screeching halt 
completely.133 
This is particularly concerning due to the impact that it may have on a 
corporation’s ability to protect the corporate attorney–client privilege and 
work-product protection during the investigation. As explained in Part III, 
supra, the Yates Memo brings back the culture of waiver and once again 
threatens the attorney–client privilege and work-product protection. 
Therefore, because both conservatives and liberals agree that the  
attorney–client privilege and work-product protection are sacrosanct,134 a 
solution that requires the government, rather than the corporations, to 
investigate corporate misconduct is a far more attractive solution. 
B. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE 
Once the government has completed its own investigation of the 
corporation, it may still be difficult to hold high-level executives accountable 
for corporate misconduct without some change in the law. A legislative 
solution, therefore, may be needed to accomplish the government’s goals. 
A good example can be found in the healthcare and environmental 
context, where the government can prosecute high-level executives by using 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine.135 The doctrine, which the 
 
 133. Green & Podgor, supra note 61, at 76. 
 134. Copeland, supra note 29, at 1199 & n.3 (explaining that both liberal and conservative 
groups were against the culture of waiver of the attorney–client privilege and work-product 
protection and lobbied the DOJ to change its policy that required waiver to demonstrate 
cooperation).  
 135. In the healthcare context, the available charges are for strict liability regulatory offenses 
such as violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Crime of 
Being in Charge: Executive Culpability and Collateral Consequences, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 827 
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Supreme Court created in United States v. Dotterweich136 and United States v. 
Park,137 permits the government to prosecute an executive for a misdemeanor 
violation, regardless of the officer’s lack of awareness of misconduct, if, by 
reason of the officer’s position in the company, she had the responsibility and 
authority either: (1) to prevent the misconduct in the first place; or (2) to 
promptly correct the violation, but failed to do so.138  
While scholars have criticized the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
on the basis that there is essentially no defense available to charges based on 
the doctrine,139 it could serve as a legislative model for the prosecution of 
corporate officers in cases that do not involve public welfare offenses. The 
goal for the prosecution of high-level executives should be felony, rather than 
misdemeanor, offenses. Therefore, because there needs to be some level of 
moral blameworthiness that can be attributed to the executive, the potential 
legislation should require knowledge of, or involvement in, the misconduct 
before felony liability could attach to a high-level executive. It should also be 
possible to demonstrate knowledge through willful blindness so that high-
level executives cannot insulate themselves from liability through secret 
agreements with their subordinates.  
Even with this type of legislation, however, it will still be hard to prosecute 
individuals because it is often difficult to prove intent.140 Nonetheless, if the 
government performs its own investigation, makes deals with individuals to 
obtain incriminating information about high-level officials, and then has the 
assistance of legislation which permits it to prosecute high-level executives for 
the misconduct of their subordinates, it will be much more successful than it 
would be by simply relying on the investigation of the corporation and the 
Yates Memo to pressure the corporation to provide information about 
culpable individuals in order to save itself from prosecution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Yates Memo is nothing more than a return to the “culture of waiver” 
that was reviled by the legal community. Its requirement that corporations 
identify and provide all relevant information concerning individual 
wrongdoers within the corporation in the name of cooperation is no different 
 
(2014). The responsible corporate officer doctrine is used in the healthcare and environmental 
context because the court has determined that they are public welfare offenses, which means that 
they involve “dangerous activities or materials” and a “reasonable person should be aware of the 
risks involved with [the] activities” because they “seriously threaten the community’s health or 
safety.” Id. at 805. 
 136. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283–85 (1943). 
 137. See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 138. Id. at 673–74. 
 139. See Copeland, supra note 135, at 804 (explaining that the doctrine is “flawed” because it 
does not matter whether the executive is knowledgeable about the offense and the only defense 
is impossibility but that it has never been used successfully in a responsible corporate officer case). 
 140. See Garrett, supra note 125, at 1831–37. 
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than requiring waiver of the corporate attorney–client privilege to prove 
cooperation. Furthermore, not only does the Yates Memo put the corporate 
attorney–client privilege in grave jeopardy, but it also threatens the  
employer–employee relationship. Over the past twenty years, the government 
has become too reliant on the internal investigations of corporate counsel. If 
the government wants to hold individuals accountable for corporate 
wrongdoing, it is time for it to do its own job. It is in the public interest that 
the government, rather than corporate counsel, perform investigations and 
make the case that individuals broke the law. Finally, with legislation that is 
loosely modeled on the responsible corporate officer doctrine, the 
prosecution is much more likely to be successful at holding high-level 
executives criminally accountable for misconduct within the organization. 
